(In)compatibility of Human Rights and the Islamic Doctrine: Implications for the Future of Human Rights in the World of Islam,

Morality and ethics may not have been the major focus of International Relations so far. The onset of the new millennium, however, presents itself with a desperate need for a common morality that would effectively impact the world politics and improve the ‘everyday’ lives of people around the world. Universal human rights, as the basis of such a global morality, are certainly not effectively enforced yet. But the idea of their existence and their legitimacy grows stronger in people’s minds all across the national and cultural boundaries. The possible universality of those rights poses a number of philosophical questions, and indeed may sometimes even prove to be false and inauthentic. However, the reality of universal “human wrongs”[2] calls for establishment of truly universal and legally binding “equal and inalienable rights of all.”[3]

The Arab Middle East, and the Islamic world in general, is often perceived by many Western human rights activists to be an area of humanitarian tragedy. Naseer Aruri argues, “Irrespective of the type of government, ideological coloration or foreign policy orientation, (…) conservative or ‘progressive’, theocratic or secular, nearly all regimes [of the region] have displayed a thorough disregard for individual human rights.”[4] This tragic practice of ‘human wrongs’ is increasingly attributed to Islam and the local Islamic traditions. It is certainly undeniable, to even very conservative Muslims, that the implementation of human rights within the region is not impeccable. The unequal status of women, lack of full freedom of religion, illegal detention, coerced testimonies, abuse of domestic workers, absence of legitimate political participation, practice of hudud[5] punishments, such as stoning of adulterers, hanging of homosexuals, etc. All these practices are still relatively common in the Islamic world.


One needs, however, to question what is the basis of that abusive behaviour and whether it is legitimate to claim its origin in theology and the practice of Islam. The (dis)respect of human rights in the region is often very tightly connected to its problematic historical relationship with the West. The contemporary human rights regime with its culture of truly modern individualism is commonly perceived as yet another example of increasing ‘Westoxification’,[6] or ‘Occidentosis’.[7] Therefore, popular contempt of human rights is often expressed in its anti-Western idiom and represents common disgust with the Western secular world rather than any legitimate exemplification of truly Islamic tradition.

However, there appears to be a strong ambiguity towards the issue of human rights stemming from possible multiplicity of understandings of fundamental Islamic texts. Islam, however being “not inherently illiberal,” [8] has a very “complex and somewhat paradoxical”[9] relationship with politics and human rights issues.  Traditional readings of the Qur’an and the al-Huquq al-Shari’yya (the Islamic Law), as well as the sunna[10] often leads to denial of certain human rights, as not legitimate in the Islamic tradition. Nonetheless, Islam in its exceptional nature is remarkably open to interpretation, ijtihad. Such interpretation was even strongly recommended by the Prophet (pbuh). Therefore, as indicated by Shamsuddin al-Kaylani, “Mohammed Arkoun recognises the presence in Islam of the ‘petals’ or ‘seeds’ of human rights,”[11] which can serve as a foundation for reconciling Islam with the modern ideal of human rights.


This significant ambiguity has nonetheless, led to often very conflicting opinions on the hereby-raised question. (In)compatibility of the two notions proves to be highly problematic. It is, however, imperative that we recognise the strong potential for proper reconciliation and strive to build cross-cultural understanding of human rights locally and globally. This reconciliation is most needed in relation to two very controversial concepts within the Islamic thought. Therefore, this examination of human rights in Islam will mostly focus on the issue of womanhood and the freedom of religion. This article does not, however, attempt to be a finite evaluation of human rights issues in Islam and will only address some of the most important philosophical and political debates surrounding the notion of human rights.


The ‘terrifying’ rise of Islamism and constant tension along the West-East ‘battle lines’, are claimed to epitomise the Huntingtonian ‘clash of civilisations’. In fact, it was the issue of human rights discussed during the UN Vienna Conference in June 1993 that influenced Huntington to advance his widely disputed claim of the absence of globally universal human values even stronger.[12] Many Arab ambassadors and foreign ministers that attended this conference unanimously objected to the idea of universality of all human rights, as stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This incident strongly reminds of the Saudi Arabian abstention during the ratification of the UDHR in 1948, when “the reluctance of a conservative Islamic government to endorse the emancipatory concept of human rights, a concept that is perceived to be alien and detrimental to the Islamic tradition”[13] was first ever manifested on the international arena.


This strong opposition to the culture of human rights, according to Katerina Dalacoura, is deeply embedded in the historical perspective and the relationship the Islamic world has had with Western civilisations.[14] The critical application of social and political historicism proves extremely beneficial to our understanding of various Middle Eastern phenomena. One needs to remember that the idea of human rights, although in a form different from the current modern understanding, has never been absent in the Islamic tradition.  Although, according to Dalacoura, “the idea that human beings have rights qua human being is absent, in explicit form, from the Koran and the Shari’ah,”[15] many ‘human rights’ have been widely respected in various Islamic communities. Former President Rafsanjani of Iran arguably reminds, “That which the international community is trying to draw up nowadays has been under discussion in Islam for a long time.”[16] Indeed, some of the human rights such as political equality of women or their right to possess property, inexistent in the West till late 19^th century, was already present throughout the Islamic world in the seventh century. The concept of human rights of some kind, as suggested by Heiner Bielefeldt, “is not exclusive to Western cultures.”[17] Therefore, Mawdudi, although controversial in his human rights claims, “blame[s] the West for claiming human rights to be an exclusively Occidental heritage,”[18] thus disregarding Islamic tradition of rights.


Islamic concepts of human rights were strongly affected by the history of the region and an extremely long tradition of distrust between the Christian West and the Muslim East. Naseer Aruri cites the Ottoman millet system, as the best example of such interaction between the two civilisations and its impact on human rights in the region. The Millet system provided the religious minorities of the Empire with considerable political freedoms, which later came to be undermined by the ‘humanitarian interventions’ of the British, French and Italian colonial powers.[19] These supposedly humanitarian actions aimed at supporting the Christian minorities quickly led to popular distrust towards Christians. Minorities became to be perceived as agents of the Western colonial powers, thus effectively worsening their societal position.

Sayyid Qutb, on the other hand, still accuses the West of “the spirit of Crusadism,”[20] thus further indicating this deeply imbedded resentfulness.  Moreover, the rhetoric of post-colonialism remains constantly powerful, not only among the Islamist groups of the region but also on the very streets of Cairo, Islamabad or Teheran. Hassan al-Banna, as noted by Moussalli, discusses the issue of rights with relation to political conflicts between the two civilisations and subsequently denies any religious nature of this discord: “The West is not fighting the East because it is Muslim, for the West fought within itself more severe wars than those with Muslims. (…) The West wants to control the East politically and economically. (…) The West is now unjust and repressive.”[21]


The idea of political and cultural ‘repression’ has immense implications for implementation of human rights in the region. Recent scepticism towards them is often expressed in a clear anti-Western idiom. Bielefeldt notes that any real commitment to the idea of international human rights regime is perceived as a new Western ‘crusade’.[22] Unfortunately, this notion is only strengthened by current political instability in the region and the Western involvement in local politics. Many Islamist movements, on the other hand, use this argument to legitimise their fight against the intrusive secular West. The historical perspective, however, strongly suggests that the local practices of human prove to be distinctly influenced by various socio-political aspects. Not only does this indicate some clearly non-religious factors at play, but also raises some significant doubts about the legitimacy of Huntington’s theory of clash of civilisations. It becomes apparent that mutual openness and dialogue are critical for the future of human rights in the region. Al-Ghannushi, a progressive Islamist reformist, advances that “This presupposes (…) putting an end to the abstract geographic and cultural division of the world into East and West and the preconception that one is rational and democratic, the other perverse and despotic.”[23]


Philosophical debate on the predicament of human rights in the world of Islam is currently focused around two fundamental social distinctions. “The major distinctions in Islam”, according to Bielefeldt, “are between the faithful and the non-faithful, and between men and women, and they both present major problems for the concept of human rights.”[24] No other category of rights appears to be more debatable and the impact of this disagreement proves to be extremely important. Moreover, and more importantly, arguments over these two notions exemplify the intrinsic ambiguity of Islamic texts towards human rights. This ambiguity may paradoxically prove dangerous and derogatory, but at the same time it indicates seemingly wide potential for reconciliation.


Freedom of religion, so fundamental to Prophet Mohammed (pbuh),[25] has been highly securitised in the Islamic tradition and poses one of the thorniest issues in the relationship of Islam with human rights. Equality between Muslims and non-Muslims raised a whole lot of theological debate, whereas the incidents of apostasy came to be perceived as not only crimes “against God”[26] but also crimes against the authority of the state,[27] and therefore punishable by death. This punishment, however, produced much controversy, and according to Khadduri does not have any legal basis in the Qur’an or the Hadith. Hudud punishments reflect the practices implemented during the tribal wars of rebellion after the death of the Prophet (pbuh).[28] Thus, clearly indicating the socio-political nature of the legal amendments.

Apostasy can, however, be also instigated from above and the cases of excommunication are not too rare. The case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, an Egyptian Islamic theologian and philosopher, is a perfect example of such practice. Strikingly enough, Abu Zayd was excommunicated for his strong critical voice in the human rights debate. “Although the traditional death penalty for apostasy does not exist in the criminal codes of contemporary Islamic states – except Mauritania and Sudan,” as noted by Bielefeldt, “cases of imprisonment and even execution on the charge of apostasy have been reported in recent years.”[29] Fortunately enough, none of the above was executed on Abu Zayd. But his excommunication carried traditionally harsh consequences in civil law. His marriage has been announced null and void. Finally, he was forced to leave Egypt and now resides in Belgium. Quite clearly this incident is a blatant example of human rights abuse and constitutes a violation of Article (18) of the UDHR.


Freedom of religion and conscience is often violated, and many theologians legitimise it with their exegesis of Islamic texts. One needs to, however, acknowledge a very flagrant ambiguity on this issue. It is incredibly difficult to explain the simultaneous existence of two highly conflicting passages. With reference to non-believers the Qur’an states unequivocally in Sura (2:190): “Slay them wherever you find them”[30]. But just a few pages later, one reads in Sura (2:256), “there is no compulsion in religion.”[31] Yet, another strand in the Muslim tradition calls for peaceful and equal coexistence with non-Muslims.[32] This ambiguity is often used to legalise confessional inequality. Christians and other monotheists were historically provided with considerable religious tolerance, but not full freedom or equal legal and political rights.[33] As ahl al-dhimma, or people of the contract and security, they were always second-class citizens.[34] Tabandeh recognises this inequality and discusses it with reference to apparent unequal treatment stipulated in the criminal code of Shari’ah, where the punishment for murder is different depending on whether the victim is a Muslim or not.[35] Moreover, all these ‘privileges’ were reserved for ahl al-Kitab, the monotheist peoples of the Book, thus indicating that atheists and polytheists were entirely deprived of any rights whatsoever.[36] This notion of inequality is unfortunately still present in articles (5), (10) and (11) of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI)[37] that carries some legal recognition in the Middle East.


Article (5), although widely consistent with the established human rights nomenclature, safeguards the right of marriage with “no restrictions stemming from race, colour or nationality”[38] alone. It is therefore, clearly discriminatory with regards to the category of faith by comfortably excluding religion from the aforementioned restrictions. Article (10), on the other hand, not only presupposes the superiority of Islam over other religions, but also indicates the potential for criminalisation of non-Islamic missionary activities. Moreover, it presupposes the fact that apostasy in Islam is forbidden. Finally, article (11) “suggest[s] that the official approach of Muslim countries to civil and political rights [is] distinguishable from that of non-Muslim countries by reason of their reliance on shari’ah rules.”[39]


There is, however, no universally binding exegesis of basic Islamic texts and this phenomenon is quite evident with relation to the hereby-discussed freedom of religion. Mohammed Talbi is interestingly explicit in his contempt for any inequalities based on religion. “(…) religious liberty is fundamentally and ultimately an act of respect for God’s sovereignty and for the mystery of His plan for man (…). (…), to respect man’s freedom is to respect God’s plan. To be a true Muslim is to submit to this plan.”[40]


Following his argument leaves no doubt that freedom of conscience and religion, as indicated in article (18) of the UDHR, could be fully implemented in the Islamic background. Existence of many contradictory readings of Qur’an implies that “we are not really constrained by the text”[41] and that our interpretation of Islamic texts may be, in this regard, a matter of choice and political will. Moussalli claims that “The Prophet’s state was based on religious freedom”[42] and such freedom is certainly achievable again.


The issue of women in Islam receives considerable media coverage in the West.  A Muslim woman is often believed to epitomise human rights violations in the Middle East. Indeed, their plight proves to be recurrently unbearable and the inequalities between sexes raise much of international concern. The traditional Islamic doctrine seems to be blatantly discriminatory, as “the idea of equal rights regardless of gender is unknown to the traditional Shari’ah.”[43] Dalacoura notes that, “A man is allowed to use physical violence against his wife; he can divorce her without explanation; he can be polygamous if he so chooses; he has exclusive rights of custody over the children in case of separation; and testimony of one male witness is equal to that of two women.”[44]


The extent of sexual intolerance and inequality is undisguised. Incidents of misogyny and chauvinism are striking. Geraldine Brooks maintains that “women are expected to sacrifice their comfort and freedom to service the requirements of male sexuality.”[45] Moreover, some Islamist thinkers, as Faysal al-Mawlawi, go into a considerable effort to legitimise that sexual discrimination, in this case polygamy, and cover it behind some highly disputable, if not completely irrational, ecological and biological reasoning. He then claims, “First, there are more women than men; second, it [polygamy] protects women from exploitation by men; third, if some women cannot bear children, they are not inhumanly divorced; fourth, if some women become permanently ill, their husbands marry others without divorcing them.”[46]

Human rights violations against women in this particular region are certainly alarming. One needs to, however, again question their origins thoroughly. Although, some interpretations of basic Islamic texts seem to support this inequality, I believe it is academically inaccurate to attribute them to Islam. Moreover, this ahistorical simplification would only lead to further misunderstandings and securitisation of Islam. Dalacoura reminds the reader that the notion of womanhood, perhaps more explicitly than others, confirms the idea that Islam, as a religion, is not independent of surrounding social, cultural and political factors. “Nowhere does the Qur’an clearly say that women must be veiled; that stoning is the punishment for adultery; or that women must be secluded or circumcised.”[47] Indeed, a large majority of these inhumane practises have strong cultural or tribal origins and do not necessarily represent religious precepts of Islam.


Moreover, various liberal and feminist thinkers and activists have attempted to go back to Qur’anic readings in order to indicate the absence of any restrictions on women and illegitimacy of any unequal treatment. Indeed, they argue that the history of the early umma proves that the Prophet (pbuh) strived to enhance the position of women in society. It is claimed that it is our responsibility to take this work further and finally eradicate all types of sexual discrimination. Nonetheless, unequal treatment of women is still apparent in various modern political and constitutional texts and declarations. The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights exemplifies such political attitude. Articles (20), on the Rights of Married Women “imposes unequal distribution of inheritance between men and women.”[48]


Human Rights, as stipulated in the UDHR, are inherently “individual entitlements that evolved from European modern thought on natural law.”[49] Their universal nature is claimed to be beyond question[50] and the need for international human rights regime becomes increasingly striking. The Muslim Middle East is definitely one of the regions that require their implementation. They, however, do not exist in their current form in the basic Islamic writings. Their disparate natures become increasingly more difficult to reconcile. The hermeneutical impediments have been highly aggravated by the impact of historical, socio-political and cultural factors. Indeed, one may not fully understand this predicament without reference to history of the region. It appears to be a common ground that the current contempt of human rights in the Arab world is not so much an opposition to the idea of those rights but rather a reaction to negatively perceived cultural and political impact of the West. This idea though posing various difficulties, proves that there is no fundamental religious incompatibility of human rights and Islam. This becomes even more apparent when one recognises the characteristic ambiguity of the Qur’an, which allows us to ‘choose’ and ‘lobby’ a humanitarian interpretation. Historic evaluation of the questions of freedom of religion and the womanhood further indicate such hermeneutical and social ‘plasticity’. But above all, it is critical to remember that people are not only “animals with cultures”, as Carrithers reminds us, but “profoundly social animals, living in and through their relations with each other and acting and reacting upon each other to make new relations and new forms of life.”^[51]

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